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1Optimal licensing contract: the implications of preference function
1. Introduction
The seminal papers by Kamien and Tauman (1984 and 1986) show that “outside innovators”1
prefer fixed-fee licensing and auction than royalty licensing, regardless of the industry size
and/or the magnitude of innovation. Hence, the wide prevalence of output royalty in the
licensing contracts (see, e.g., Rostoker, 1984) remained a puzzle, and created significant
interest in analysing the implications of technology licensing.2
In an earlier work, Rockett (1990) considers a duopoly market with an inside innovator
and homogeneous products and shows that the equilibrium licensing contract consists of a
positive output royalty only if there is no imitation. In a duopoly market with homogeneous
products, Wang (1998) shows that a licenser prefers royalty licensing than fixed-fee licensing
if the licenser is an inside innovator. Although these papers provide new insights, they cannot
explain an important fact, i.e., the existence of positive fixed-fee and output royalty in the
licensing contracts, in the absence of imitation, which may be the outcome of a strong patent
system.3
Sen and Tauman (2007), Mukherjee and Balasubramanian (2001) and Mukherjee
(2014) show the implications of number of firms, product differentiation, and decreasing
returns to scale, in explaining the existence of positive fixed-fee and output royalty in the
licensing contracts. Sen and Tauman (2007) show that the result of Rockett (1990) holds if the
1 Outside (inside) innovator refers to the situation were the innovator is not (is) a product-market competitor of
the licensees.
2 In the case of an outside innovator, Gallini and Wright (1990) show that a technology licensing contract can
consists of fixed-fee and output royalty if quality of the licensed technology is private information.
3 For example, Rostoker (1984) shows that royalty and fixed-fee was used for 46% of time among the firms
surveyed.
2number of licensees is not more than two; however, if the number of licensees is at least three,
the equilibrium contract can involve fixed-fee and output royalty. In a duopoly market with an
inside innovator, fixed-fee and output royalty can occur in equilibrium if the firms produce
differentiated products (Mukherjee and Balasubramanian, 2001). Mukherjee (2014) shows that
fixed-fee and output royalty can occur in the presence of decreasing returns to scale
technologies.
We focus on a different aspect in this paper. We show how the consumer’s preference
function affects the licensing contracts.
We consider a duopoly market with horizontally differentiated products to show how
the market expansion effect influences the licensing contract. Considering two popular demand
functions due to Shubik and Levitan (1980) (where the market size is independent of the degree
of product differentiation) and Bowley (1924) (where the market size is significantly affected
by the degree of product differentiation) as two extreme cases, we show that as the market
expansion effect gets stronger, the range of product differentiation over which the equilibrium
licensing contract consists of output royalty only increases. Hence, the consumer’s preference
function affects the possibility of having positive fixed-fee and output royalty in the licensing
contracts.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
shows the results. Section 3 concludes.
2. The model and the results
Assume that there are two firms, firm 1 and firm 2, competing in a product market like Cournot
duopolists with horizontally differentiated products. Assume that the technology of firm 1 is
better than the technology of firm 2. The marginal cost corresponding to the technology of firm
31 is 1c , which we normalise to 0 for simplicity, and the marginal cost corresponding to the
technology of firm 2 is c > 0. This cost difference creates the possibility of technology
licensing, which is the focus of this paper. Our results do not depend on the simplifying
assumption of 1 0c  .
The inverse market demand function for the ith good, is 1 [1 (1 )]i i jP s g q gq     , i
= 1, 2, i j , where iP is the price of the ith good, iq and jq are the outputs and [0,1]g is
the degree of product differentiation. This demand function is generated from the utility
function 2 21 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1( , ) ( ) [1 (1 )] ( )
2
U q q q q s g q q gq q       . If g = 0, the goods are isolated
and if 1g  , they are perfect substitutes. The parameter s ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of
market expansion, where s = 1 corresponds to no market expansion effect, as in Shubik and
Levitan (1980), and s = 0 generates a preference function due to Bowley (1924), which shows
that the market size significantly increases with higher product differentiation. It is worth
noting that product differentiation is important for our analysis. Without product
differentiation, i.e., if g = 1, the market expansion effect, captured by s, has no effect, since the
demand functions are independent of s for g = 1.
If we aggregate the demand functions, we get 11 2( ) [1 (1 )] 2(1 )q q g s g P
      ,
where 1 2
2
P PP  is the average price. As s reduces, the total demand increases, implying that
the market size increases. If s = 1, we get 1 2( ) (1 )q q P   , suggesting that the total demand
is independent of g, as in Shubik and Levitan (1980). If s = 0, we get
1
1 2( ) [1 ] 2(1 )q q g P
    , suggesting that a lower g increases the total demand, i.e., the
market size increases with higher product differentiation, as in Bowley (1924).
4We consider the following game. At stage 1, firm 1 decides whether to license its
technology to firm 2. In the case of licensing, firm 1 gives a take-it-or-leave-it licensing
contract with a non-negative up-front fixed-fee (F) and a non-negative per-unit output royalty
(r).4 At stage 2, Firm 2 accepts the licensing contract if it is not worse off by accepting it than
rejecting it. At stage 3, conditional on the licensing decision, the firms compete like Cournot
duopolists and the profits are realised. We solve the game through backward induction.
2.1. No licensing
First, consider the game under no licensing, which creates reservation payoffs of the firms
under licensing.
If there is no licensing, firms 1 and 2 determine their outputs to maximise
1
1 2 1[1 (1 s(1 g)) gq ]qMax q q    and 2 2 1 2
[1 (1 s(1 g)) ]
q
Max q gq c q     respectively.
Standard calculation shows that the equilibrium outputs and profits of firms 1 and 2 are
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We consider that 1
2
c  , which ensures that both firms always produce positive outputs.
2.2. Licensing
4 It is usual to consider non-negative fixed-fee and royalty in the licensing contract (see, e.g., Rockett, 1990). This
may be due to anti-trust regulation to prevent collusion among the firms.
5Now consider the game under licensing, which allows both firms to use the technology of firm
1. Under licensing, firms 1 and 2 determine their outputs to maximise
1
1 2 1 2[1 (1 s(1 g)) gq ]qMax q q rq F      and 2 2 1 2 2
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respectively.
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.
Since firm 1 gives a take-it-or-leave-it contract, it charges the fixed-fee in a way so that
the net profit of firm 2 is the same under licensing and no licensing. Hence, the equilibrium
fixed-fee is determined by
 
2
* 0
2
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The equilibrium royalty is determined by maximizing the following expression:
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where *F is given in (1), and the equilibrium fixed-fee and equilibrium royalty are non-
negative.
The royalty rate that maximises (2) is given by
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We get from (3) that 1( 1)
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Hence, there exists a critical value of g, say, *( )g s , such that optr c for *( )g g s , optr c
at *( )g g s and optr c for *( )g g s .
Since the fixed-fee is non-negative, the equilibrium royalty rate must not exceed c,
implying that the equilibrium royalty rates are *r c for *( )g g s and * optr r for *( )g g s
. Hence, the equilibrium licensing contract is given by * *{ 0, }F r c  for *( )g g s , and by
* * *{ ( ) 0, }opt optF r r r r c    for *( )g g s .
The following proposition summarises the above discussion.
Proposition 1: (i) If *( )g g s , the equilibrium licensing contract consists of royalty only and
the royalty rate is equal to c (i.e., * 0F  and *r c ).
(ii) If *( )g g s , the equilibrium licensing contract consists of a positive output royalty equal
to optr and a positive fixed-fee corresponding to the royalty rate optr (i.e., * *( ) 0optF r r 
and * optr r c  ).
7The reason for the above result is as follows. The reason for charging a positive output
royalty is to soften competition after technology licensing. However, it distorts the output
choice of the licensee, which reduces the fixed-fee. As the products get differentiated,
competition between the firms reduces, which reduces the need for softening competition
through output royalty. Hence, if the products get differentiated, the royalty rate reduces. If the
products are sufficiently differentiated, the royalty rate is less than c, which allows firm 1 to
charge a positive fixed-fee. However, if the products are close substitutes, the competition
softening motive becomes important, and firm 1 charges no fixed-fee and the equilibrium
royalty is equal to c.
We find that
  
 
    
     
22 3 4 2
3 42 3
232
8 20 18 3 3 6 2 3
2 2 2 1
12 2 1
0
8 1
6 1 1 8 1
opt
g g g g g g s
g g g s
g g s g s
g g s s
r
gs s
       
     
         
      

 

,
implying that as s reduces (i.e., the market expansion effect gets stronger), optr increases and
therefore, *( )g s falls since 0
optr
g



. This implies that a lower s increases the range of g over
which the equilibrium royalty rate is equal to c.
Hence, the following proposition is immediate.
Proposition 2: If s falls, i.e., the market expansion effect gets stronger, the range of g over
which the equilibrium royalty rate is equal to c increases, implying that the possibility of an
equilibrium licensing contract with output royalty only increases.
8The reason for the above result is as follows. As the market expansion effect gets
stronger for a given degree of product differentiation, i.e., as s decreases, it increases the market
size and therefore, firm 1’s incentive for softening competition through output royalty. Hence,
as the market expansion effect gets stronger, i.e., s decreases, the equilibrium royalty rate
increases and thus, increases the range of product differentiation over which firm 1 charges
only royalty under licensing.
As an example, Figure 1 shows optr for s = 0 and s = 1.
Figure 1
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9above diagram shows that there are values of g for which the equilibrium licensing contract
consists of royalty only for s = 0 while the licensing contract consists of positive fixed-fee and
output royalty for s = 1, implying that the consumer’s preference function, which affects the
market expansion effect (i.e., s), affects the possibility of having positive fixed-fee and output
royalty in the licensing contracts.
3. Conclusion
The extant literature shows that the possibility of imitation, number of firms, product
differentiation and decreasing returns to scale are the reasons for the co-existence of fixed-fee
and royalty in the licensing contracts.
We show in this paper how the consumer’s preference function, affecting the market
size, influences the licensing contracts. As the market expansion effect gets stronger, the range
of product differentiation over which the equilibrium licensing contract consists of output
royalty only increases. Hence, the consumer’s preference function affects the possibility of
having positive fixed-fee and royalty in the licensing contracts.
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